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RECENT CASE NOTES
deeply into this point it is appropriate to note that if this is an exercise, of
the taxing power it must be for a public purpose, and if it is an exercise of
the police power, it must be in support of a sufficient social interest. It is not
expressly stated to be for a public purpose and as has already been stated, it
does not appear that the people have any greater social interest in the pres-
ervation of the independent merchant than they have in the preservation of
chain stores which are of undisputable aid to those in the proletariat class and
also to any of those who trade with them.
J. o. M.
Constitutional Law-Contempt of Senate. Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review a judgment reversing
a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus by one who had been arrested by the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate of the United States. The petitioner, Wil-
liam P. MacCracken, Jr., was summoned to appear before the Special Com-
mittee of the Senate for the investigation of all existing contracts entered into
by the Postmaster General for the carriage of air mail and ocean mail, and to
bring all books and papers relating thereto. He appeared but refused to
produce some of the papers under the claim of privileged communications
between clients and himself. The Committee decided that all papers should
be produced despite the claims of privilege, but meanwhile one of the clients
with the permission, and another client without the permission of the petitioner,
but with the permission of his partner, took some of the papers relating to
the contracts and destroyed part of them. The petitioner was then cited for
contempt. The petitioner contends that the Senate is without power to arrest
him with a view to punishing him, because the act complained of was the
"past commission of a completed act which prior to the arrest and the pro-
ceedings to punish had reached such a stage of finality that it could not
longer affect the proceedings of the Senate or any Committee thereof, and
which, and the effects of which had been undone long before the arrest".
Held, the Senate may punish for past contempt in failing to produce evidence,
notwithstanding the evidence was thereafter produced or its production has
become impossible.'
The power of Congress to punish for contempt is primarily a matter of
historical development rather than one of Constitutional interpretation. The
Constitution of the United States is silent upon the subject of punishment for
contempt except as it gives each house power "to punish its members for dis-
orderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member",
but Congress has in numerous instances acted upon the theory that it has
such an auxiliary power.2
The English House of Commons set the example by first exerting the
contempt power and the Colonial Assemblies which were modeled thereon
instituted the practice in America. Through legislative custom the contempt
power came to be recognized as an auxiliary of the legislative power, and was
conferred without specific provision as a matter of course on all legislative
bodies created in early American history. The practice of the Continental
Congress and the State and National Legislative Assemblies fully demon-
strate this growth.3
I Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr.. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 405.
2Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 615.
3 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 828; Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927),
2 Ind. L. J. 615.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Prior to 1927 there were four decisions of the United States Supreme
Court upon the question of the contempt powers of Congress, 4 namely,
Anderson v. Dunn,5 Kilbourn v. Thompson,6 In re Chapman, 7 and Marshall
v. Gordon.8  By these decisions the Supreme Court "prior to 1927 had up-
held the contempt powers of Congress so far as they related to keeping order
among its own members, compelling their attendance, and protecting them
from the assaults or disturbances of others by physical means, although ap-
parently not if by slander or libel, and so far as they related to the discharge
of such judicial-like functions as the determination of election cases and
impeachment charges". 9
In 1927, in the case of McGrain v. Daugherty, 0 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized and upheld the power of Congress to punish for contempt in relation
to the law-making function. Although Congress does not possess any gen-
eral power to inquire into private affairs and to compel disclosures, it does
possess the power to exact information in aid of the legislative function,
with process to enforce it as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function." Thus, at the present time the Supreme Court has sus-
tained the contempt power of Congress not only with respect to its members
but with relation to investigation as the basis of intelligent law-making.
Founded upon necessity, and being an inherent part of the legislative
power, the contempt power was unaffected by the introduction of written
constitutions recognizing separation of powers and dual form of government.
The legislative bodies of each government could use freely the contempt
power as an aid to the proper performance of such powers as were assigned
it by constitutional arrangement, and where the legislature has jurisdiction
the courts will not interfere. The contempt power can be used to aid any
function of the legislature, defensive, judicial, legislative, or inquisitorial.' 2
But, having the power to punish for contempt, the legislature must have
jurisdiction. As the Court said in the principal case, "No act is so (for con-
tempt) punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the performance of the
duties of the legislature. There may be a lack of power, because, as in Kil-
bourn v. Thompson,' 3 there is no legislative duty to be performed; or be-
cause, as in Marshall v. Gordon, 14 the act complained of is deemed not to be
of a character to obstruct the legislative process. But, where the offending
act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process, the fact that the ob-
struction has been removed, or that its removal has become impossible is
without legal significance".' 5
The petitioner in the principal case makes three contentions which ques-
tion the jurisdiction of the Senate to punish him for contempt. His first
contention is that the power to punish for contempt may never be exerted,
in the case of a private citizen, solely for punishment. His second is that the
4 Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 616.
5 6 Wheat. 204 (1821).
6 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
7166 U. S. 661 (1896).
8 243 U. S. 521 .(1917).
9 Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 617.
10 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
"1Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 618.
12 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 828.
13 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
14 243 U. S. 521 (1917).
15 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 408.
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enactment in 1857 of a statute making refusal to answer or to produce papers
before either House, or one of its committees, a misdemeanor divested Con-
gress of the power to punish for such. His third is that he is not punishable
for contempt, because the obstruction, if any, which he caused to legislative
processes, had been entirely removed and its evil effects undone before the
contempt proceedings were instituted.
The first contention is disproved by the history of the legislative exercise
of the contempt power; the many cases wherein Congress punished for con-
tempt because of bribery or assault are all examples of the fact that Congress
has the power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act solely
for punishment. 16 The second contention is refuted by In re Chapman,' 7
wherein it was recognized that the purpose of the statute was merely to sup-
plement the power of contempt by providing for additional punishment, and
by the fact that Samuel Houston was indicted, convicted and fined in the
criminal court of the District of Columbia on account of the same assault for
which he was reprimanded by the House.' 8 The third contention is briefly
disposed of by the Court on the ground that it does not affect the question
of jurisdiction or power of the Senate to punish for contempt, but is merely
a factor to be considered with respect to the guilt or innocence of the peti-
tioner and as such is within the province of the Senate.' 9
The most important phase of the principal case and that with which the
Court was most concerned is the power of the Senate (and of legislative
bodies) to punish for contempt as punishment and not for the purpose of
removing an obstruction to the legislative process. As said heretofore, the
contempt power is a necessary and inherent part of the legislative power 20
and may be exercised whenever some function of the legislature has been
obstructed. The fact that the obstruction no longer exists is without legal
significance. 2 1 The House of Commons has punished contumacious witnesses
under circumstances indicating that punishment was the sole object.22 In
view of its historical derivation of the contempt power from that body, it is
only logical that Congress may exercise it to the same extent as the House of
Commons. Further, there is a well established presumption in favor of the
legality and regularity of official action, especially where such action is that
of a coordinate branch of the government. This presuniption is usually rec-
ognized by the courts with respect to the exercise of the contempt powers of
legislative bodies. 23 Thus, the decision in the principal case is a recognition
and an endorsement by the Supreme Court of the exercise of the legislative
power to punish for contempt even though the contumacious act is completed
and the legislative function no longer obstructed.
H. P. C.
Embezzlement-Required Application of Section More Specifically Ap-
plying to the Accused. Appellant was president of a retail music house and
contracted with the H. Sales Co. for it to consign pianos to appellant's com-
16Willis, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1927), 2 Ind.
L. J. 615; Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 408, Notes 4, 5.
17 166 U. S. 661 (1896).
18 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 410, Note 10.
10jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 410.
20 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 828.
21 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 408.
22 Jurney v. MacCracken, Jr. (1935), 79 L. Ed. 409, Note 7.
23 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt (1926), 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 815.
